A few days ago, Civil Defense Minister of Sweden Carl-Oskar Bohlin put out a warning that should send chills down the collective spines of Europe. Russia has now entered an openly more aggressive phase of its cybersecurity attacks on the Nordic region, signaling shifting strategies. Whereas previously it came mainly in the form of nondestructive DDoS attacks, now the civil defense minister can reveal Swedish authorities foiled a Russian plot to target a heat plant mid-2025 that could have caused physical, long-lasting damage to Swedish infrastructure.
For those who are unaware, a DDoS attack is a type of cyberattack in which a targeted website, server or online service is flooded with an overwhelming amount of malicious traffic, ultimately rendering the target unable to serve legitimate users. Annoying? Yes. Damaging? Not really, at least not permanently. This shift toward more aggressive targeting comes after potentially damaging attacks on Polish renewable energy last year, as well as several instances of mysterious damage to important subsea internet cables.
While Russian activity has grown increasingly hostile since 2022, with Poland and the Baltics being the main recipients of its most aggressive attacks, the Nordics have increasingly felt the burn. These latest statements underscore a general escalation across the Baltic Sea, where Sweden, Denmark and Norway have been on the outskirts of Russian activity. Due to an increased interdependency across the Baltic Sea region, these types of attacks are not likely to recede anytime soon. While it was foiled this time, they only need to be lucky once.
Why?
The shift from less damaging attacks, such as DDoS attacks or phishing, to more destructive ones can be summarized as follows: the strategy calculus has transformed from pressuring to punishing. The Nordics in particular have been avid and steadfast supporters of Ukraine, with some of the highest support among the population in all of Europe. However, that has been the case since the start of the war, and it would make little sense to start “punishing” the Nordics for their allegiances at this stage.
What changed then? One part could be that the Nordics, together with other allies such as France and the U.K., have become much more aggressive on cracking down on the so-called “shadow fleet,” so much so that they are now actively avoiding Swedish waters. As an important financial lifeline for the ailing Russian economy, it would make sense for them to be rather protective of these assets.
Another is, believe it or not, President Donald Trump. His low opinion of NATO and its members is no secret, and so Russia may have simply believed they could get away with it. For President Vladimir Putin, testing the limits of Article 5 is key to undermining the alliance, and considering the lax (even derisive) attitude of the U.S. president, now may be the perfect time.
A third is desperation. Although Russia recently had a financial windfall thanks to the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, for the first time ever there have been more Russian casualties than could be recruited last month. They have now been stuck in a bloody, WWI-style, pointless war of attrition for years and only increased their tight control of Russian citizens since, while their standards of living have only decreased. There’s an air of annoyance brewing in the Kremlin.
However, it should be noted that Russia has operated in the hybrid warfare gray zone since before the outbreak of the war, often invading airspace with jets as if to probe for a reaction. This is nothing new. Although the foiled attack on the heat plant is concerning to the Nordics, it should hardly be thought of as an escalation. Rather, it is an expansion of the sort of tactics that Poland and the Baltics have been enduring for years now.
What It Means for Us
What could possibly be their aim then? Hybrid warfare tactics often have several intertwining aims that can be somewhat elusive. One is to project power, and thus stoke fear, at a time when they may be weak, but NATO is even weaker. Another is to gather information on targets and response time from authorities, valuable information should push come to shove.
However, the most important and more tangible goal is to increase the cost and burden on members of NATO. If at every sighting of a submarine going through Kattegat Sweden and Denmark must mobilize jets to monitor them, the costs will increase. Fatigue will set in. The bet, then, is that through enough persistence they can wear certain regions and countries down, which hopefully decreases the amount of support they can spare for Ukraine. Furthermore, by becoming more openly aggressive, they hope to scare the population as well as make the current governments look weak (if the attacks are successful). Contempt will then follow, which could cause political instability that could paralyze countries and thus delay support for Ukraine. They do not care whether the opposition is of the left or the right, only that compromise becomes impossible and, by extension, action. Chaos is the goal.
That being said, it is well documented that such attacks rarely, if ever, have a significant impact on the opinion of the population. The Baltics and Poland are no less supportive of Ukraine than before, neither are they about to fall into paralysis despite tense political situations domestically. In fact, it could backfire and galvanize the targeted populations further, and the attacks could expose previously unknown flaws that now can be remedied. The only real achievable goal, then, is to drain resources and posture.
So, what does it mean for us in the Nordics? Simply put, aggressive attacks will increase. There have been incidents on the Swedish island of Gotland, which often suffers from drought, around water treatment plants where mysterious individuals have been snooping around. In summer, we are likely to see increased attacks on water supply, whereas in winter they will most likely target energy infrastructure or heat plants. Potentially, we could also see wildfires started in summer on Russian command (though it should be noted that there have been no documented cases of wildfires started for these purposes, but they are no strangers to arson attacks). This is a known playbook of the Russians from Ukraine to Poland, and now it has been extended to the Nordics. They attack vulnerable infrastructure at the time when they are under the most pressure to maximize the effect on the population, and thus the pressure on the government.
There is sadly not much we can do as individuals, other than prepare ourselves by having updated survival kits at home and hope that the authorities catch the incidents before they can occur. However, one day one or more will slip through. Such is our new reality. However, considering the degraded state of the Russian economy and military, it is a small price when Ukrainians are already paying for it with their blood. This is not something the Nordics have provoked, other than supporting Ukraine, and as such stopping that support is the only thing that may satisfy the Russians. These days, the Nordic and Baltic region is so interconnected that even if one country pulled back on its support, it would surely be affected when an attack occurs on one of the others.
The Kremlin may be counting on our fatigue, but they have consistently underestimated Nordic resolve. If the price of standing with Ukraine is a cold radiator or a disrupted server, it is a bargain many in the Nordics would be proud to pay.